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JUDICIAL DOUBLETHINK AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: THE FALLACY OF
ESTABLISHMENT BY INHIBITION
ROBERT E. RIGGS*
The first amendment to the United States Constitution declares
that Congress shall "make no law respecting an establishment of
religion." Until the mid-twentieth century the Supreme Court was
seldom asked to construe the establishment clause, and in no instance
was a constitutional challenge sustained.' Beginning with the Court's
1947 decision in Everson v. Board of Education,2 however, the clause
began to take on new life. Although Everson upheld a New Jersey
law authorizing government reimbursement of bus fares for children
attending private schools, its "wall of separation" dicta suggested that
the establishment clause might become a formidable barrier to govern-
ment action in support of religion.' This intimation proved well-founded
when, a year later, the Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois program
for released time religious education on public school premises as an
unconstitutional establishment of religion.'
The subsequent development of establishment clause
jurisprudence was by no means sure-footed, but with the 1971
parochiaid case of Lemon v. Kurtzman,' the law became crystallized
into the current "black letter" constitutional rule. To pass muster a
challenged statute must satisfy each of three requirements.
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster "an excessive government entanglement
with religion."8
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young Univer-
sity. B.A., 1952, M.A., 1953, University of Arizona; Ph.D., 1955, Illinois; LL.B., 1963,
University of Arizona.
1. See Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930); Arver
v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1917); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908); Brad-
field v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
2. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
3. Id. at 15-16. For discussion of "wall of separation" see infra text accompa-
nying notes 46-49.
4. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). But see Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952), where the Court upheld a New York City program for released-
time religious education off school premises.
5. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
6. Id. at 612-613.
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While the application of this rule has not been easy, or even
consistent,7 since 1971 the three-part Lemon test has been the normal
starting point for most establishment clause analyses. Its applicability
to statutes treating some religions more favorably than others, as con-
trasted with laws benefitting religion generally, was challenged in Lar-
son v. Valente, a 1982 decision to be discussed below.' Nevertheless,
the Lemon test remains the accepted rule, at least with respect to
"laws affording a uniform benefit to all religions. '
Critics of the Lemon test have been plentiful,"0 but few have ad-
dressed the problem which is the central focus of this paper. I will
argue that much of the muddled analysis emanating from establish-
ment clause cases is attributable to a false premise underlying the
second and third prongs of Lemon, namely, that religion can be
established by being inhibited."1 Judging from recent trends in the
lower courts, the confusion is likely to grow worse unless the Supreme
Court chooses to rectify the error. In the following pages this argu-
ment will be developed under several headings: first, a brief comment
on the meaning of religious establishment and the theoretical problems
raised by Lemon; second, a look at the genesis and subsequent utiliza-
tion of the "inhibits" test; third, an examination of "entanglement"
7. See comments of Justice White on the Court's lack of clarity as quoted
infra in the text accompanying notes 103-104.
8. 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982). See discussion infra in text accompanying notes
122-163.
9. 102 S. Ct. at 1687. See also Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 505
(1982), and Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317 (1984), in which the Lemon test was
applied by the Court during its most recent terms. See also Marsh v. Chambers, 103
S. Ct. 3330 (1983), where the Court ignored Lemon and relied on historical analysis
in upholding Nebraska's right to hire a clergyman to offer prayer in sessions of the
legislature. Justice Brennan, in dissent, found the practice in violation of all three
prongs of the Lemon test. Id. at 3337 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Both the district court
in Chambers v. Marsh, 504 F. Supp. 585 (D. Neb. 1980), and the Eighth Circuit in
Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1982), had held the Nebraska practice in-
valid under the Lemon test.
10. See, e.g., R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 198-200 (1982); Gaff-
ney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy
History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205,209-212 (1980 Giannella, Lemon
and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971 SuP. CT. REV.
147; Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten-Year Assessment,
27 U.C.L.A. REV. 1195, 1216-1218 (1980).
11. Although this point has been little noted in the literature, one seminal
exception is Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373
(1981). The Laycock piece centers primarily on the free exercise right of church
autonomy, but it also carefully delineates the relationship between the two religion
clauses.
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as another form of establishment by inhibition; fourth, an analysis of
Larson v. Valente and its implications for establishment clause
jurisprudence; and finally, an assessment of Lemon's impact on the
lower courts.
What is Religious Establishment?
The traditional concept of an established church, as well as its
dictionary meaning, is that of a favored church." As Cooley put it
in his late nineteenth century treatise, "By establishment of religion
is meant the setting up or recognition of a state church, or at least
the conferring upon one church of special favors and advantages which
are denied to others."'3 Historically, the hallmarks of an establishment
were state sponsorship, support of the established religion from public
funds and, in its most egregious forms, legally compelled acceptance
of particular creeds and modes of worship. 4 Establishment was often
accompanied by political intermeddling in the affairs of the state
church,'15 including doctrinal matters and key ecclesiastical appoint-
ments," and in other instances by intermeddling of the church in the
12. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 391 (1975), where
"establish" is in part defined as "to put into a favorable position" or "to make (a church)
a national institution"; and THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
897 (1971): "From 16th c. often used with reference to ecclesiastical ceremonies or
organization, and to the recognized national church or its religion... Hence in recent
use: To place (a church or a religious body) in the position of a national or state church."
13. T. COOLEY, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 224-225 (1898). See also Fahy,
Religion, Education, and the Supreme Court 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 73, 80 (1949).
14. For example, 0. BARCK AND H. LEFLER, COLONIAL AMERICA 387 (2d ed. 1968),
discuss the enactment in several colonies of "blue laws" designed to promote orthodox
observance of the "Lord's Day." 0. ARNOLD, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 28 (1978) also
observes,
In many of the early colonies Protestant church membership was required
for the holding of public office; taxes were levied for church maintenance;
and each colony had its sorry record of repression and out and out persecu-
tion of Jews, Quakers, and dissenters, varying only in intensity. Only Rhode
Island began and maintained a consistent policy and record of religious
freedom.
See also C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY. AND F. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISH-
MENT 3 (1964). For individual cases of strict enforcement of religious orthodoxy by a state-
supported church in Europe, see W. DURANT, THE REFORMATION 567-77 (1957).
15. Note, e.g., the adoption by Parliament in 1534 of the Act of Supremacy,
which created the Church of England "and gave the King all those powers over morals,
organization, heresy, creed, and ecclesiastical reform which had heretofore belonged
to the Church." W. DURANT, supra note 14, at 548-49. See also C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY.
AND F. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 3-4.
16. In fifteenth-century England, for example, a large proportion of the House
of Lords was composed of abbots and bishops. "To offset this, Henry VII-and later
19841
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affairs of the state. 7 Although state churches undoubtedly were in-
hibited in some respects by the government connection, the essence
of establishment was state support, not inhibition." The state-imposed
burdens rested primarily on the disfavored religions, not the
established church.
The framers of the first amendment religion clauses recognized
that governments were capable of burdening the exercise of religious
liberties as well as conferring favors upon an established religion. In-
deed, the one might logically follow from the other; in historical
experience it had frequently done so. Adherents of the established
church were often in a position to deny religious liberties to the
others.19 But no one supposed that the religious beliefs and practices
of the persecuted dissenters were thereby being established. Rather,
the unwilling victims of enforced religious conformity were being sub-
jected to penalties, quite the converse of establishment. The first
amendment's two-part religious proscription addressed both of these
concerns: governmental benefits to a preferred religion and govern-
mentally enforced burdens upon anyone's religious liberty. Thus Con-
gress was enjoined to "make no law respecting an establishment of
Henry VIII-insisted on the right of the kings to nominate the bishops and abbots
of England from the eligible clergy; and this dependence of the hierarchy on the mon-
archy eased the clerical surrender to Henry VIII's assertion of royal supremacy over
the English Church." W. DURANT, supra note 14, at 115.
The same author discusses the adoption by the Scottish Reformation Parlia-
ment of the Confession of Faith, written by John Knox, as the officially sanctioned
creed of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland (1560). Thus a compulsory religious dogma
was, theoretically at least, imposed on a nation by legislative fiat. Id at 618-19.
17.
No small part of the clergyman's influence lay in his close association
with the state, principally in New England. His election day sermons were
heard with deference and respect, and the civil government frequently
referred civil matters to church congregations and synods for settlement.
Moreover, in the Southern colonies, where the Anglican Church was
established by law, its commissaries, as well as parish vestries, exerted
considerable political and educational influence.
0. BARCK AND H. LEFLER, supra note 14, at 387.
18. Clearly the inhibition does not create the establishment. It is rather the
price paid in the coin of free exercise for the state support and sponsorship which
constitutes the establishment. For a brief catalog of restraints that a religion may
suffer by reason of its establishment, see Laycock, supra note 11, at 1382-1384.
19. Thus, in Congressional debates on the proposed Bill of Rights, James
Madison interpreted "establishment" to mean "that Congress should not establish a
religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship
in any manner contrary to their conscience," 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (Gales & Seaton
ed. 1834). Obviously, one effect of enforced observance of the established religion would
be infringement upon the religious liberties of dissenters.
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religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." No argument was
heard that the guarantee of free exercise was redundant of the ban
on religious establishment and therefore unnecessary. It was well
understood that establishment referred to preferences, not burdens,
and the whole range of religious freedoms could not logically be pro-
tected by reference only to establishment. 0 The establishment
guarantee would undoubtedly offer protection against laws imposing
religious conformity in aid of an established church, but it simply could
not speak to government infringement of religious liberties based on
reasons independent of preference for a state sponsored religion.
In one important respect the drafters of the establishment clause
did intend to prevent Congress from inhibiting religion, although their
purpose is irrelevant to any current controversy. I refer to the con-
cern that the new national government might interfere with existing
state establishments of religion.2' As originally reported by a commit-
tee of the U.S. House, the proposed constitutional amendment read,
"[N]o Religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights
of conscience be infringed."'" On its face this wording could be con-
strued to prohibit state as well as federal establishments, and it posed
a threat to states with established churches."3 Ultimately the wording
was changed to place limits only upon Congress, and the prohibition
on establishment was expanded to include any law "respecting" an
establishment so that Congress might neither establish a religion nor
interfere with existing state establishments.' The establishment clause
was thus intended to prevent Congress from "inhibiting" established
20. See, e.g., comments of L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 839 (1978),
who ignores the "inhibits" dictum of Lemon and states the law as it should be:
[If the essential effect of the government's action is to influence-
either positively or negatively-the pursuit of a religious tradition or the
expression of a religious belief, it should be struck down as violative of
the free exercise clause if the effect is negative, and of the establishment
clause if positive.
21. At least seven states gave legal preference to one religion over another
at the time the first amendment was adopted. These included Connecticut, Delaware,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and South Carolina. See Kruse,
The Historical Meaning and Judicial Construction of the Establishment of Religion Clause
of the First Amendment, 2 WASHBURN L.J. 65,94-107 (1962).
22. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 729 (Gales & Seaton ed. 1834).
23. See, e.g., comments of Huntington of Connecticut and Tucker of South
Carolina, id. at 730, 755.
24. See comments of W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1068 (1953); 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES S 1879 (3d ed. Bos. 1858); Kruse, supra note 21, at 67-72;
Hansen, Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical Examination of
the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U.L. REV. 645, 651-653.
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state religions. This has no practical significance today in view of the
incorporation of the first amendment as an element of due process
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.25
Recognition of the need for language addressed to individual
rights of conscience as well as to religious establishments is also il-
lustrated in proposals from several of the State Ratifying Conven-
tions urging that the newly created Constitution be supplemented with
a Bill of Rights including, among other things, guarantees against in-
termeddling by the national government in religious affairs.26 The
Maryland Convention proposed, "That there be no national religion
established by law; but that all persons be equally entitled to protec-
tion in their religious liberty."27 A "Declaration or Bill of Rights" ap-
proved by the Virginia Ratifying Convention included a proposition
asserting "that all men have an equal, natural, and unalienable right
to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience,
and that no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored
or established, by law, in preference to others." 8 Likewise, the New
York Convention proclaimed:
that the people have an equal, natural, and unalienable right
freely and peaceably to exercise their religion, according
to the dictates of conscience; and that no religious sect or
society ought to be favored or established by law in
preference to others.29
In all these proposals, as in the Amendment itself, a law respecting
25. Incorporation of the religion clauses dates from Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940). Although Cantwell involved a free exercise issue, Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), confirmed that the establishment clause had been ab-
sorbed by the fourteenth amendment as well.
26. The First Amendment at its inception was of course limited in applica-
tion to the national government. The Fourteenth Amendment, as subsequently inter-
preted by the Court, has made the religion clauses a limitation on the states as well.
See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
27. J. ELLIOTT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION II, 553 (1901).
28. Id. III, at 659.
29. Id. I, at 328. See also resolutions adopted by the North Carolina and Rhode
Island Conventions, id. I, at 334, IV, at 244. A very helpful discussion of the genesis
of the establishment clause is found in R. CORD, supra note 10, at 3-15 and passim. Cord
presents a convincing and well-documented argument that, historically, the first amend-
ment was not intended to preclude nondiscriminatory governmental aid to religion
nor to provide "an absolute separation or independence of religion and the national
state." Id. at 15. Rather, it was intended to safeguard individual freedom of conscience
and preclude any national establishment or denominational preference.
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establishment is conceived as preference or support, while the burdens
or disabilities are associated with governmental actions inhibiting the
free exercise of religious belief and worship. 0
Lemon and the Theory of Establishment
The second prong of the Lemon test (the statute's "principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion")
stands in stark contrast to the traditional notion of establishment.
By its implication that burdening a religion is just the same as sup-
porting or preferring a religion, for purposes of the establishment
clause, Lemon tore the concept loose from its moorings with history
and all common understanding. Intellectually, if not contextually, the
attempt to equate "inhibiting" with establishment is of one piece with
the peculiar vision of reality reflected in Big Brother's insistence that
"War is Peace," "Freedom is Slavery," and "Ignorance is Strength."'"
Although, these Orwellian slogans are rough intellectual
equivalents of Lemon's insistence that "inhibiting is establishing," the
incongruity of Orwell is rather more obvious on its face that the fallacy
of Lemon. That is partly because the terms "inhibit" and "establish"
are less sharply defined opposites that "war"and "peace" or "freedom"
and "slavery." It is less obvious also because restraints upon religious
liberty are in some circumstances properly associated with the
establishment of religion. I would argue, however, that laws inhibiting
religion raise legitimate establishment questions only when the
disabilities are imposed in aid of a state-preferred religion or mode
30. For subsequent commentary confirming that "establishment" was seen by
the framers as inhering in preference, assistance, and support, see, e.g., 2 J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 1870-1874 (3d ed. Boston
1858); T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 470-71 (1868); M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND
POLITICS, THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12-15 (1978). The
proposition that "establishment" means support or preference would seem so obvious
as not to require any extensive argument or citation. Since the United States Supreme
Court, by repeated dictum, has insisted that inhibiting religion may be an alternate
means of establishing it, however, the citations may be necessary to buttress the point
that the framers never entertained such a concept. Some writers, of course, have simply
accepted the Court's dictum as gospel, regardless of its incongruence with history
or good sense. Pfeffer, for example, observes: "Advancing religion obviously constitutes
establishment, but inhibiting religion means prohibiting its free exercise, and that too,
the Court has held, constitutes a violation of the establishment clause." Pfeffer, Freedom
and/or Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of the First Amendment, 64 MINN. L.
REV. 561, 566 (1980). See also Pfeffer, Unionization of Parochial School Teachers, 24 ST.
LOUIS U.L.J. 273-89 (1980), which accepts at face value the notion that inhibiting religion
is one form of establishment.
31. ORWELL'S NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR: TEXT, SOURCES, CRITICISM (E. Howe ed.
1982). The slogans appear throughout the book but are discussed in depth at 122-144.
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of worship." If a state, for example, were to ban all forms of worship
except that prescribed by a particular Christian sect, the resulting
massive denial of religious liberties could surely be attacked as a viola-
tion of the free exercise clause. Because religious repression of this
nature would reflect a policy of giving state preference to a single
religion, it would also be a violation of the prohibition on laws "respec-
ting an establishment of religion." Here at least in theory, is an area
in which the coverage of the two religion clauses plainly overlaps,
since the same facts (religious persecution) give rise to claims under
both clauses. But the two claims relate to analytically different effects
of the persecution: free exercise is violated by the burdens placed
upon the repressed victims; establishment is violated by the support
this gives to the state church. As a practical matter, this hypothetical
example presupposes a type of fact situation whose probability of aris-
ing anywhere in the United States is approximately zero. Yet this
is the case envisioned by the Everson allusions to the coercive aspects
of establishment: repression in aid of a preferred religion.
The case that does occur with some frequency is the govern-
mental regulation which has the effect of burdening one or a number
of religions selectively and is challenged as an "establishment" of the
exempted religions. Such a challenge, for example, was raised by Bob
Jones University when the Internal Revenue Service revoked the
school's tax exempt status because of its policies against student in-
terracial dating and marriage.' Similar attacks were made against
statutes regulating charitable contributions in Minnesota and North
Carolina which provided a religious exemption for churches receiving
more than half their total contributions from members. 4 In each case
the exclusion of particular religious organizations from a broad
32. Laycock discusses three possible ways in which inhibitions of religion may
result from religious establishments: 1) repression of some religions in aid of a pre-
ferred religion or religions; 2) loss of church autonomy as a result of strings attached
to governmental aid programs; and 3) secularization of the aided religion through
watering down government-sponsored rituals (e.g., school prayer) or draining the mean-
ing from church symbols (e.g., Sunday closing laws). Laycock, supra note 11, at 1382-84.
He nevertheless makes a persuasive case that burdens arising from discrimination
or loss of autonomy are best approached as free exercise questions. Secularization
of religious symbols, on the other hand, may be susceptible only to an establishment
challenge based on the government effort to support religion, since complainants "would
be hard pressed to make out a claim that the government has secularized the symbol
for them against their will." Id. at 1384.
33. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). A companion
case, Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, was decided in the same opinion.
34. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982); Heritage Village Church v. North
Carolina, 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726 (1980).
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religious exemption was alleged to be an establishment of the religious
organizations to which an exemption had been granted. Here the
establishment clause analysis is at least colorably consistent with the
theory that establishment involves aid and support rather than
burdens, because the analytical focus is on the preferential status of
the exempted religions.
The reasoning underlying this application of the establishment
clause has some force when used, for example, to attack a Sunday
closing law as an unconstitutional aid to religions having Sunday as
their holy day. The aid constitutes the alleged establishment, and the
requested remedy is to terminate the aid by invalidating the law."
But the logic of the analysis breaks down completely when applied
to the revocation of Bob Jones University's tax exemption or to the
state statutes regulating charitable contributions. In those cases the
offended religious organizations did not contend that conferral of a
general religious exemption was unlawful establishment of religion,
nor did they ask that the religious exemption cease. Instead, the com-
plaining organizations wanted the benefit extended to them. This
would eliminate the objectionable preference, but it certainly would
not eliminate the aid to religion. A complaint that seeks to remove
burdens upon particular religions, rather than terminating government
aid to religion, may sound in free exercise or equal protection but
not in establishment.
The reference to free exercise points to another theoretical flaw
in the notion that the establishment clause may be violated by govern-
ment acts that inhibit religion as well as those that advance it. Burden-
ing religions is the essence of a free exercise violation. If the establish-
ment clause is also violated when religion is inhibited, the selfsame
act that burdens free exercise also raises an establishment issue.
Almost by definition, every free exercise case becomes a potential
establishment case. In the absence of any clear distinction between
free exercise burdens and establishment burdens, that is an open in-
vitation to analytical redundancy. Lemon's effect in thus obscuring
the boundary between establishment and free exercise is discussed
further below."
35. That the Court has upheld Sunday closing laws takes nothing away from
the logic. The Court simply denied the factual premise, i.e., that Sunday closing laws
were intended to aid religion. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
36. Infra at text accompanying notes 50-57. See also infra at text accompany-
ing notes 58-111 for discussion of the Lemon "entanglement" test as another version
of establishment by inhibition.
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Genesis of the "Inhibits" Test: The Everson Legacy
An inquiry into the genesis of the inhibition test may help explain
how the United States Supreme Court maneuvered itself into this
curious position. Certainly the second Lemon prong was not cut out
of whole cloth by Chief Justice Burger for the purpose of striking
down various aids to parochial schools legislated by Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island. Its antecedents are traceable to Everson v. Board of
Education,37 where Justice Black gave this expansive and much quoted
interpretation of the establishment clause:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amend-
ment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to
go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No per-
son can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to sup-
port any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Govern-
ment can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of
any religious organizations or groups or vice versa. In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religions by law was intended to erect "a wall of separa-
tion between church and state." Reynolds v. United States,
supra at 164."
Most of the proscriptions in the quoted paragraph are traditional
establishment concerns-aid, preference, financial support, government
participation in the affairs of religious organizations. 9 The italicized
sentences, however, can be taken as authority that government action
which inhibits religion-or at least some kinds of inhibitions-may
also run afoul of the establishment clause. Certainly, forcing a person
37. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
38. Id at 15-16 (emphasis added).
39. Justice Black's statement that the clauses prohibited aid to all religions
as well as discrimination among religions has become the settled law of the Court,
but it was not then and is not now universally accepted as a correct interpretation
of the First Amendment. For extensive documentation of a contrary view see R. CORD,
supra note 10.
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"to remain away from church" or to "profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion," and punishing him for "professing religious beliefs" or
for church attendance would have the effect of inhibiting religion. But,
as Laycock notes, such language does "not support a general rule that
any inhibition of religion is an establishment." 0 And, given the con-
text of these two sentences, sandwiched between definitions of
establishment as preference and support, the recited practices are best
interpreted as infringements on individual religious liberty that might
flow from vigorous state support of a favored religion.
This interpretation is strengthened by Justice Black's earlier
discussion, in the same opinion, of the historical circumstances which
gave rise to the framers' concern about religious establishments. He
dwells in some detail on the familiar story of religious persecutions
which impelled many Europeans to seek haven in the New World and
which, unfortunately, continued to be visited upon dissenters in many
of the colonies. These included, in his words, punishments for "speak-
ing disrespectfully of the views of ministers of government-established
churches, non-attendance at those churches, expressions of non-belief
in their doctrines, and failure to pay taxes and tithes to support
them."'" The entire discussion leaves no doubt that establishment in-
volves state support for a favored church, and persecution of non-
believers was simply one aspect or consequence of that support.'2
Justice Black himself made this very point some fifteen years
later when speaking for the Court in Engel v. Vitale,'3 the school
prayer case. The establishment clause, he asserted, rested in part
upon an awareness of the historical fact that governmentally
established religions and religious persecutions go hand in
hand. The Founders knew that only a few years after the
Book of Common Prayer became the only accepted form of
religious services in the established Church of England, an
Act of Uniformity was passed to compel all Englishmen to
attend those services and to make it a criminal offense to
conduct or attend religious gatherings of any other kind..."
Although some fifteen years separate the two opinions, Justice Black
had in mind such practices as the Act of Uniformity when he wrote
in Everson that the establishment clause precluded government from
40. Laycock, supra note 11, at 1381.
41. 330 U.S. at 9.
42. Id. at 8-11.
43. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
44. Id. at 432.
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coercing belief or disbelief and church attendance or non-attendance.
He obviously regarded such laws as a serious restraint upon religious
liberty, but he also recognized that they would fall under the establish-
ment clause proscription if perpetrated in aid of an established church.
Viewed in this context, Justice Black's definition of the scope of the
establishment clause, as set forth in Everson, is quite consistent with
traditional and accepted definitions of establishment and in no way
supports the proposition that any law which inhibits religion is
necessarily a violation of the establishment clause."
Everson, interpreted in light of Engel, did not mandate such
expansive applications of the establishment clause, but its ambiguity
provided an opening large enough to accommodate the camel's nose.
Subsequent courts, perhaps bemused by the "wall of separation" im-
agery, have pushed the entire camel into the establishment tent. Ever-
son undoubtedly contributed to this development by its erroneous
characterization of the establishment clause as the sole foundation of
the "wall." Justice Black's "wall of separation" metaphor was drawn
from Jefferson's well-known letter dated January 1, 1802, to the Dan-
bury Baptist Association and was correctly quoted as far as it went."
Unfortunately the words quoted were sufficiently out of context to
misconstrue the meaning in a way having significant implications for
the scope of the establishment clause.
The Everson statement, including the attribution to Jefferson,
ran as follows: "In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establish-
ment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation
between church and state."'4 7 What Jefferson actually said was this:
45. Despite this strong affirmation of the separation doctrine, the Court held
that the New Jersey law in question did not violate the establishment clause by reim-
bursing parents for the cost of bus fares of parochial school pupils. In dissent, Justice
Rutledge argued that the New Jersey law could not survive the strictures of the
establishment clause, but he defined it expressly in terms of government aid or sup-
port (which was of course the issue at hand):
The Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the official establish-
ment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal relation
such as had prevailed in England and some of the colonies. Necessarily
it was to uproot all such relationships. But the object was broader than
separating church and state in this narrow sense. It was to create a com-
plete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and
civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid
and support for religion.
330 U.S. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
46. The full text of the letter is found in S. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFER-
SON 518-19 (1943) [hereinafter cited as S. PADOVER].
47. 330 U.S. at 16.
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Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies
solely between man and his God, that he owes account to
none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative
powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions,
I contemplated with sovereign reverence that act of the
whole American People which declared that their legislature
should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a
wall of separation between church and State.48
According to Everson the wall of Jeffersonian metaphor was founded
upon the establishment clause. According to Jefferson, it was built
upon both clauses.
If one takes the separation metaphor seriously, as the Court
seems to do, the discrepancy in the premise can have important logical
consequences. The wall, speaking in terms of the governmental action
against which the Amendment was directed, could be breached in two
ways: by government support of religion or by governmentally inflicted
burdens upon religion. The religion clauses, taken together, provide
against both eventualities. The establishment clause outlaws religious
preferences and the free exercise clause proscribes governmental
burdens upon religious worship and belief. If, however, the wall rests
solely upon the establishment clause, that clause must necessarily be
a barrier both to benefits and burdens, or leave the job only half done.
Delineating with precision the morphology of a metaphorical wall
would ordinarily not be thought a matter of great constitutional
moment. In this case the distinction between a one-clause wall and
a two-clause wall is important because the Court has appeared to
premise its analysis upon the idea that the establishment clause must
perform both functions."9
Schempp: Establishment Swallows Free Exercise
The crucial leap from Everson's ambiguity to the clear-cut illogic
of establishment by inhibition was made in Abington School District
48. S. PADOVER, supra note 46, at 518-19.
49. Laycock regards Everson's misconstruction of Jefferson as the origin of
the misconception that laws may establish by inhibiting: "The 'inhibits' part of the
establishment clause test began by misquotation and exists by repetition. It is time
to examine the question afresh." Laycock, supra note 11, at 1381. Justice Reed un-
doubtedly perceived the growing effect of the "Wall of Separation" metaphor when
he observed a year after Everson, in McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 247
(1948) (Reed, J., dissenting): "A rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech."
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v. Schempp,' the Pennsylvania school Bible reading case. The
appropriate passages of Justice Clark's opinion, joined by seven other
members of the Court,"' must be quoted at length to reveal the con-
ceptual difficulties created by his new formulation:
The wholesome "neutrality" of which this Court's cases
speak thus stems from a recognition of the teachings of
history that powerful sects or groups might bring about a
fusion of governmental and religious functions or a concept
of dependency of one upon the other to the end that of-
ficial support of the State or Federal Government would
be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies.
This the Establishment Clause prohibits. And a further
reason for neutrality is found in the Free Exercise Clause,
which recognizes the value of religious training, teaching
and observance and, more particularly, the right of every
person to freely choose his own course with reference
thereto, free of any compulsion from the state. This the Free
Exercise Clause guarantees. Thus, as we have seen, the two
clauses may overlap. As we have indicated, the Establish-
ment Clause has been directly considered by this Court
eight times in the past score of years52 and, with only one
Justice dissenting on the point, it has consistently held that
the clause withdrew all legislative power respecting
religious belief or the expression thereof. The test may be
stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect
of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition
of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative
power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say
that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause
there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Everson v.
Board of Education, supra; McGowan v. Maryland, supra,
at 442. The Free Exercise Clause, likewise, considered many
times here, withdraws from legislative power, state and
federal, the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise
50. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
51. Only Justice Stewart dissented. Justices Douglas, Goldberg, and Brennan
joined the opinion but submitted separate statements as well.
52. The eight cases to which he referred were Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943); and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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of religion. Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the
individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil
authority. Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for
one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it
operates against him in the practice of his religion. The
distinction between the two clauses is apparent-a viola-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion
while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so
attended. 3
Although the italicized sentences unequivocally assert that the
establishment clause is violated by either the advancement or inhibi-
tion of religion, the quoted passage taken as a whole is not totally
free from ambiguity. It begins with a reasonably accurate statement
of what the two religion clauses were traditionally thought to pro-
hibit. The establishment clause is described as prohibiting "official
support" of "the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies," while the free
exercise clause protects religious liberties from "state compulsion."'
Yet the distinction between establishment as support, and denial of
free exercise as compulsion, is virtually obliterated in Justice Clark's
formulation of his establishment clause "test." This is because sup-
port (to advance religion) and compulsion (to inhibit it) are both em-
braced within the concept of establishment, and either, apparently,
is sufficient to trigger the strictures of the clause.55
So what remains of the distinction between the two clauses?
According to Justice Clark, invocation of the free exercise clause re-
quires a coercive effect, while an establishment clause violation "need
not be so attended."' Standing by itself, this statement is accurate
enough. It is consistent with the idea that the free exercise clause
speaks to burdens, restrictions, or compulsion upon religious belief
and conduct. It is not inconsistent with the concept of establishment
as support.
But coercion is not a criterion that distinguishes very well the
53. 374 U.S. at 222-23 (emphasis added).
54. The reference to "overlap" of the two clauses is also unexceptionable, since
the establishment of a state church had always been recognized as a threat to the
religious freedom of non-established religious groups.
55. Note that Everson (without page citation) and McGowan, at 442, are given
as authority for this test. The relevant portion of Everson is quoted supra, text ac-
companying note 38, and McGowan simply quotes the same passage from Everson. This
is not strong authority for the Clark test.
56. See Laycock, supra note 11, at 1385, for a cogent examination of "coer-
cion" as a basis for distinguishing the two clauses.
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boundaries between the two clauses, at least not in those instances
where an establishment clause violation is attended by coercion. A
sensible view of establishment might minimize this problem by
identifying the establishment clause with coercion only where the coer-
cion is an incident of a law intended to advance one religion over
another-the Act of Uniformity being the extreme case. Unfortunately,
Justice Clark has ruled out this saving interpretation by his test. If
either the effect or the purpose of the law is "the advancement or
inhibition of religion," the case falls within the establishment clause.
Coercion thus provides no useful distinction at all. Governmental action
that coerces religious conduct or belief is, by definition, a violation
of free exercise; but since coercion must necessarily have some in-
hibiting effect, it invokes the establishment clause as well.
Unavoidably, therefore, under the definitional analysis of
Schempp, every free exercise case must also be an establishment clause
case (unless "coerce" has a broader meaning than "inhibit" in this con-
text, and no Court opinion has ever suggested that). Such a conclu-
sion is, of course, semantic and constitutional nonsense, but it follows
ineluctably from the test enunciated by Justice Clark and since
repeatedly endorsed by the courts. No court has yet stated that the
establishment clause has totally absorbed the free exercise clause, and
the Supreme Court has never yet applied the "inhibits" test to in-
validate a governmental act. But given the premises, the conclusion
is inescapable that establishment logically embraces the whole range
of free exercise questions.57
Entanglement: Another Form of Establishment by Inhibition
With Schempp the first two prongs of the establishment test were
formulated in essentially their present form. Walz v. Tax Commission'
provided the basis for the third prong of the Lemon test. Walz upheld,
against an establishment clause challenge, the validity of state prop-
erty tax exemptions granted to religious organizations on properties
used solely for religious worship. The opinion of the Court, written
57. The syllogism runs as follows: Major premise: Any law that inhibits religion
violates the establishment clause. Minor premise: Any free exercise violation inhibits
religion. Conclusion: Any law that violates the free exercise clause also violates the
establishment clause. If the Court isn't saying this, what is it saying?
58. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). One intervening establishment clause case, Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), upheld a New York state law providing textbooks
on loan to parochial school students. Allen was another exercise in line-drawing but
offered no new doctrinal developments. It merely quoted the advance/inhibit test of
Schempp. Id. at 243.
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by Chief Justice Burger, concluded that the legislative purpose of the
tax exemption was neither to advance nor inhibit religion. 9 But the
Court went beyond this test by inquiring whether the exemption con-
stituted "excessive government entanglement with religion.""° En-
tanglement was represented as an additional test directed toward the
"end result" or "effect" of the law,61 rather than its purpose, and in
this respect was a departure from Schempp, which held that the ad-
vance/inhibit test was applicable to both purpose and effect.62 In his
analysis of entanglement the Chief Justice talked of "confrontations
and conflicts" that would follow from "official and continuing
surveillance" and "enforcement of statutory or administrative
standards."63 These indices or incidents of entanglement looked more
like burdens than benefits, thus making the new test appear as a
specialized form of the Schempp test for effects that inhibit. The Court
decided that granting tax exemptions to churches would bring lesser
government involvement than taxing them and hence was sustainable
under the entanglement test.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,4 Chief Justice Burger combined the pur-
pose and effect tests of Schempp with the entanglement test of Walz
to provide the current three-part test for establishment clause viola-
tions, at least for laws conferring benefits upon religions in general.
At issue in Lemon was the constitutionality of statutes in Rhode Island
and Pennsylvania providing state financial aid to supplement teachers'
59. The discussion suggested that Chief Justice Burger may have had both
the establishment and the free exercise clauses in mind when he referred to "advance-
ment" and "inhibition." At least, he identified "establishment" with sponsorship and
free exercise with "interference."He wrote, "For the men who wrote the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment the 'establishment' of a religion connoted sponsorship, finan-
cial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." Id. at 668.
And further:
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that
has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either govern-
mentally established religion or governmental interference with religion.
Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for
play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.
Id. at 669. See also id. at 673 where "noninterference" is expressly identified with
the free exercise clause.
60. Id. at 674.
61. Id.
62. Lemon resolved this difficulty by making "entanglement" an additional
test of effects. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
63. 397 U.S. at 674, 675.
64. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The companion cases to Lemon were Robinson v.
DiCenso and Earley v. DiCenso, which involved similar facts arising in Rhode Island.
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salaries in church-related schools. The Court conceded that the laws
in both states had a secular legislative purpose, i.e., enhancing the
quality of secular education,65 but the second test-whether the
primary effect of the law was to advance or inhibit religion-was never
reached. Instead the Court focussed on the third prong and concluded
that the statutes constituted impermissible entanglement of church
and state.' In an effort to forestall a successful establishment clause
challenge, both states had restricted the use of state monies to the
teaching of secular subject matter only. The Court seized on these
restrictions, with their potential for government surveillance and in-
terference in the religious education process, as a reason for in-
validating the aid programs. 7
Once again, the state acts that constituted, or at least threatened,
unconstitutional entanglement had the appearance of burdens rather
than benefits. The entanglement was in no way characterized as spon-
sorship or endorsement. Rather, the Court talked of "comprehensive,
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance,"6 8 "a relationship
pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction of church
schools,"6 and the "danger that pervasive modern governmental power
will ultimately intrude on religion and thus conflict with the Religion
Clauses."7 While the entanglement rationale purported to address an
aspect of establishment not covered by the purpose and effect tests,
it was in reality but another way of addressing effects which inhibit
religion. Granted, the entanglement holding of Lemon reaches a
somewhat narrower spectrum of effects than the broad dictum of
Lemon's second prong, but at bottom it is equally devoid of common
sense and in conflict with traditional notions of religious establish-
ment. It still rests on the untenable premise that the state may
establish religion by placing burdens upon it.'
65. Id. at 613.
66. Id. at 613-14.
67. Id. at 619-22.
68. Id. at 619.
69. Id. at 620.
70. Id.
71. In the same case Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment but did not
fall into the same error:
Intermeddling, to use Madison's word, or 'entanglement,' to use what was
said in Walz, has two aspects. The intrusion of government into religious
schools through grants, supervision, or surveillance may result in establish-
ment of religion in the constitutional sense when what the State does
enthrones a particular sect for overt or subtle propogation of its faith.
Those activities of the State may also intrude on the Free Exercise Clause
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In the Lemon opinion the Chief Justice laid primary emphasis
upon the kind of entanglement that might arise from administrative
interference by governmental agencies in the affairs of "church schools
and hence of churches."7 As we have repeatedly emphasized, this is
governmental action which burdens religion rather than supports it,
even though the entanglement may be a consequence of state efforts
to grant aid to parochial schools without thereby "advancing religion."
In elaborating his entanglement rationale, however, Chief Justice
Burger also detected a kind of entanglement that neither inhibits nor
advances religion but yet is proscribed by the establishment clause,
that is, "the divisive political potential of these state programs."7 The
school aid programs of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island were an un-
constitutional establishment of religion, at least in part, simply because
they created the prospect of serious "political division along religious
lines." 4
The concept of "political entanglement," as distinguished from
"administrative entanglement,"75 has never yet served as the sole basis
for invalidating a state or federal regulation. It has figured as a sub-
sidiary rationale in several cases,"8 however, and Justices Brennan and
Marshall have urged that political divisiveness be considered in-
dependently as a "fourth factor" in the establishment clause test."
The political divisiveness element of entanglement is, to say the least,
an anomaly. It has nothing to do with either the advancement or in-
hibition of religion but speaks rather to impacts upon the body politic.
While one might plausibly argue that framers of the religion clauses
hoped thereby to mute the role of religious conflict in the political
arena, it surely does not follow that they intended to make the inten-
sity of political conflict on religious questions a test of constitution-
ality. In light of the accompanying first amendment guarantees of free
speech, such a conclusion seems untenable. This aspect of the "en-
tanglement" test does not bear directly on the twisted logic by which
by depriving a teacher, under threats of reprisals, of the right to give
sectarian construction or interpretation of, say, history and literature, or
to use the teaching of such subjects to inculcate a religious creed or dogma.
Id. at 634 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas obviously recognized that entangle-
ment which inhibits creates a free exercise, not an establishment, problem.
72. Id. at 620.
73. Id. at 622.
74. Id.
75. Tribe uses these terms. L. TRIBE, supra note 20, at 866.
76. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
77. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 374-75 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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inhibition has been converted into establishment, but it does further
illustrate how far afield the Court has gone in search of a rationale
for its establishment clause opinions."8
The addition of the entanglement test to establishment clause
analysis has created something approaching a catch-22 dilemma for
proponents of state aid to church-related schools. Aid without restric-
tions on the use of state-supplied resources runs a serious risk of im-
permissibly advancing religion; but government controls intended to
avert that risk may bring impermissible entanglements. 9
As applied to church-affiliated colleges the formula has been given
an interpretation loose enough to accommodate a substantial amount
of government aid. A companion case to Lemon, Tilton v. Richardson,'
sustained the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963' which provided
federal construction grants to colleges and universities. Grants were
conditioned upon using the buildings so constructed "for secular pur-
poses only" 2 for a period of twenty years. While upholding the grant
program, the Court invalidated the time limit because use of the
buildings for religious purposes after twenty years would have the
effect of advancing religion."
In Hunt v. McNair" the Court repelled a taxpayer challenge to
a South Carolina statute permitting a Baptist college to obtain low-
interest construction loans through state-issued revenue bonds, sub-
ject again to the proviso that no facilities so financed could be used
for religious purposes. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board"5
78. Perhaps in recognition of difficulties inhering in the doctrine, a five-member
majority of the Court, in Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3071 n.11 (1983), offered
as dictum the observation that "the rather elusive inquiry" into political divisiveness
should be "confined to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial
schools or to teachers in parochial schools." For a thorough critique of the "political
divisiveness" doctrine, see Gaffney, supra note 10. For other critical views of the doc-
trine see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, and J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 867-68 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, and J. YOUNG]; and Nowak, The Supreme
Court, the Religion Clauses and the Nationalization of Education, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 883,
905-908 (1976). But see TRIBE, supra note 20, at 865-869.
79. This paradox was not lost on the court: "As we noted earlier, the very
restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly
nonideological role give rise to entanglements between church and state." Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 620-21.
80. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
81. 20 U.S.C. S 701 et. seq. (1970). See also Pub. L. No. 88-204, 77 Stat. 363 (1963).
82. 20 U.S.C. S 1132e-1(B) (1977).
83. 403 U.S. at 682-84.
84. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
85. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
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upheld a similarly restricted program of non-categorical grant-in-aid
to institutions of higher education. In each case the government aid
was accompanied by some form of audit or reporting on the use of
the funds, and in each case dissenters argued that the potential for
entanglement was excessive in view of the need to ensure that the
aid was not in some way applied to religious purposes.' Although
a majority found neither the aid nor the entanglement to be un-
constitutional, all of the opinions that considered entanglement to be
an issue treated it as a burden upon religion."
Although the Court has found room in the establishment clause
for public aid to higher education, three 1973 cases demonstrated that
aid to elementary and secondary parochial schools would have much
tougher going. Since Lemon had stressed the evils of entanglement,
the State legislatures of New York and Pennsylvania proceeded to
enact programs of aid with minimal strings attached. This approach
avoided the entanglement problem but, unfortunately, had the effect
of impermissibly advancing religion through inadequately restricted
aid. Thus Levitt v. Committee for Public Education88 invalidated New
York's attempt to reimburse private schools for costs of testing and
record-keeping mandated by the state because in the Court's view,
"no attempt is made under the statute, and no means are available,
to assure that internally prepared tests are free of religious
instruction."8 Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist' struck down
other New York statutes providing partial tuition reimbursement,
parental tax deductions, and direct grants for "maintenance and
repair" to private schools serving a large proportion of low income
families. Each form of aid was held to be insufficiently restricted to
avoid the primary effect of advancing religion. 1
86. 426 U.S. 770 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 773 (Stewart, J., dissenting); 775
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. The burden was of course interwined with the subsidy. This was noted
by Justice Stevens in his brief dissent in Roemer: "...I would add emphasis to the
pernicious tendency of a state subsidy to tempt religious schools to compromise their
religious mission without wholly abandoning it. The disease of entanglement may in-
fect a law discouraging wholesome religious activity as well as a law encouraging the
propagation of a given faith." 426 U.S. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
89. Id- at 480.
90. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
91. Because the aid violated the second prong of the Lemon test the Court
saw no need to consider the issue of excessive entanglement. Justice Stewart, for
the Court, nevertheless felt compelled to comment at length on the "grave potential
for entanglement in the broader sense of continuing political strife over aid to religion."
Id. at 794.
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The third decision, Sloan v. Lemon,' was particularly excruciating
in light of the earlier holding of Lemon v. Kurtzman93 that Penn-
sylvania's parochiaid system involved excessive entanglement of church
and state. In order to avoid this problem the Pennsylvania legislature
subsequently enacted a plan for partial reimbursement of tuition paid
to non-public schools, specifically precluding state direction of any
aspect of the schools' educational programs.' In Sloan the new Penn-
sylvania statute failed the effects test because there was no means
of ensuring against the use of public funds to advance religion. 5
Subsequent school aid cases have added little to the underlying
doctrine but much to the complexity, not to say inconsistency, of the
line-drawing process that sorts out the permissible from the imper-
missible in public aid to parochial schools. Meek v. Pittenger" upheld
the loan of school textbooks in another attempt by Pennsylvania to
find some way of aiding parochial schools, but found unconstitutional
other provisions of the law which would have funded auxiliary ser-
vices (counseling, testing, remedial speech and hearing therapy), in-
structional materials (magazines, photographs, maps, charts, record-
ings, films), and instructional equipment (projectors, records, lab equip-
ment). The forbidden aid had the primary effect of advancing religion.97
Wolman v. Walter 8 approved Ohio aid to church-related schools in
the form of textbooks, standardized tests drafted and scored by public
employees, speech and hearing diagnostic services delivered in the
92. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
93. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
94. 1971 Pa. Laws, Act 92; 24 PA. STAT. ANN., SS 5701-5709 (Supp. 1973-74). The
enactment is printed in an appendix to the District Court's opinion in this case. See
Lemon v. Sloan, 340 F. Supp. 1356-1368 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
95. The Court expressly recognized the problem but contended that it was
created by the Constitution, not the Court:
[Wie are not unaware that appellants and those who have endeavored
to formulate systems of state aid to nonpublic education may feel that
the decisions of this Court have, indeed, presented them with the 'insolu-
ble paradox' to which Mr. Justice White referred in his separate opinion
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 668. But if novel forms of aid have
not readily been sustained by this Court, the "fault" lies not with the
doctrines which are said to create a paradox but rather with the Establish-
ment Clause itself . . .
413 U.S. at 835.
96. 421 U.S. at 349 (1975).
97. The textbook loan program undoubtedly had a similar effect, but the Court
was not ready to overrule Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), which had
validated a New York law providing for the loan of textbooks to students in parochial
as well as public schools.
98. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
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private schools, and therapeutic, guidance, and remedial services
rendered off the premises of the private schools. Provisions in the
same Ohio law for funding instructional materials and equipment and
field trips were invalidated because limiting their use to secular pur-
poses would require close state supervision creating the danger of
excessive entanglement." Committee for Public Education v. Regan,'"°
found another New York law consistent with the Constitution: cash
reimbursements to parochial schools for administering and grading
standardized tests (but not reimbursement for teacher-prepared tests)
were held not to have the primary purpose of advancing religion, and
accompanying audit procedures were found not to involve excessive
entanglement.
Still more recently, a closely-divided Court in Mueller v. Allen 1
upheld a Minnesota tax deduction for tuition, textbook and transpor-
tation expenses incurred by taxpayers in sending their children to
elementary and secondary schools. The Court found it distinguishable
from the New York parental tax deduction struck down in Nyquist
because the Minnesota deduction appeared to be more genuinely
related to a system of tax laws and was available for public as well
as private school expenses. Four members of the Court dissented, thus
emphasizing the continuing absence of any clear and persuasive ra-
tionale for establishment clause line drawing.' 2
Indeed the previous 5-4 Regan decision had evoked from Justice
White a frank admission that the establishment clause cases had
sacrificed "clarity and predictability for flexibility."'' 3 He attributed
this to divisions within the Court and the country: ". . . Establish-
ment Clause cases are not easy; they stir deep feelings; and we are
divided among ourselves, perhaps reflecting the different views on
this subject of the people of this country.""' What he might have said,
also, was that the prospects for a more consistent application of the
religion clauses would be vastly improved if the Court were to aban-
don the self-contradictory notion that religion can be established by
inhibiting it.
As applied in the school aid cases, at least, the Lemon test forces
99. The five separate opinions in the case indicated substantial disagreement
both in the result and the rationale. No opinion was joined by a majority of the Court.
100. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
101. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
102. Justice Marshall was joined in dissent by Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens.
Id. at 3071 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. Regan, 444 U.S. at 662.
104. Id.
19841
Riggs: Judicial Doublethink and the Establishment Clause: The Fallacy of
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
308 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
the Court to walk an uncertain line between aid that advances and
controls that entangle. Such an excruciating choice is not imposed by
any sensible interpretation of the establishment clause. The "entangle-
ment" in these cases consists of reporting and surveillance designed
to restrict public funds to secular educational uses. Reporting and
surveillance requirements do not advance religion; their avowed pur-
pose and primary effect are quite the opposite-to prevent govern-
ment resources from being used for religious purposes. Viewed in this
light, establishment by entanglement is no more than a specialized
form of establishment by inhibition, which is a self-contradiction.
Entanglement might of course raise a genuine establishment issue
if, as Justice Douglas pointed out in his Lemon concurrence, "what
the State does enthrones a particular sect for overt or subtle pro-
pagation of its faith." '05 But here again the focus is on advancement,
not inhibition. The legitimate establishment question, and the one the
Court should address, is this: Does the law taken as a whole, aid com-
bined with governmental regulation and restriction, have the primary
effect of advancing religion? Such an approach would dramatically
reduce the need to sacrifice "clarity and predictability for flexibility"
because it would allow the Court to focus squarely on the real
establishment issue: laws that advance religion.
The entanglement test has received its full share of criticism.0 6
It has been deprecated as redundant of the first two Lemon tests,l"7
lacking fixed content or readily ascertainable standards for its
application,' ° and, in its "political divisiveness" aspect, very bad public
policy.0 9 All of these criticisms have merit, but they miss the central
weakness of the entanglement doctrine, which is the untenable assump-
tion that an establishment issue can be raised by governmental regula-
tions that burden churches and church schools. Devoting public funds
to support of parochial schools raises an obvious establishment ques-
105. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 634 (Douglas, J., concurring).
106. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA and J. YOUNG, supra note 78, at 863-68 (1978);
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U.
PITT. L. REV. 673, 680 (1980); Gaffney, supra note 10; Giannella, supra note 10; Ripple,
supra note 10; Serritella, Tangling with Entanglement: Toward a Constitutional Evalua-
tion of Church-State Contacts, 44 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 143 (Spring 1981).
107. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 767-70 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring).
108. Laycock, supra note 11, at 1380, speaks of "unstructured expansiveness."
Ripple, supra note 10, at 1238-39, calls it "a criticism without an internal discipline"
which leaves the Court little but its own "personal predilections" in determining whether
entanglement is "excessive."
109. Gaffney, supra note 10, at 234-36.
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tion; but any objection to the accompanying regulations which create
and enforce restrictions upon the use of the money surely must sound
in free exercise, not establishment. The Court might properly examine
administrative entanglement to determine if it has a promotional
aspect, but in no case has the Court done so.11 Instead, the Court
has recognized the government regulation as burdensome, oppressive,
and a threat to church autonomy in the conduct of its affairs, but
nevertheless held this to be "establishment. ' . A sacrifice of clarity
indeed!
Pausing at the Brink: The Inhibits Test Still Dictum
The one bright spot in recent establishment clause jurisprudence
is the Court's refusal thus far to remove the "inhibits" test from the
realm of dictum by an outright holding that anything which inhibits
religion is thereby in violation of the establishment clause. At least
four times during recent years the Court has been presented such
an opportunity outside the parochi aid setting but has chosen to dodge
the issue rather than meet it head on. When the Tennessee Supreme
Court denied to the Reverend Paul A. McDaniel the right to seek
election as a delegate to his state constitutional revision convention,1 2
by virtue of a Tennessee statute that made ministers of religion in-
110. Not one of the many separate opinions in the establishment clause cases
has attempted to rest the entanglement analysis on this basis. Even the Douglas con-
curring opinion, see note 71, stopped short of making the application even though it
made the correct theoretical distinction between governmental intrusion which
establishes and that which threatens free exercise.
111. The Court's treatment of entanglement as a burdensome intrusion upon
religion ought also, logically, to raise a question of standing. Laycock's comments on
this point are cogent:
If government support and government control are inextricably linked
in the challenged government policy, it seems natural to review support
and control as a package, and the cases on aid to church schools have
done so. But that has had unfortunate consequences. The Court has ex-
plained why taxpayers have standing to challenge government support
of religion, but it has never explained why taxpayers have standing to
argue that an aid program entangles the state in a church's affairs. Only
the church is harmed by such interference, and only it should have stand-
ing to complain. An atheist plaintiff asserting a church's right to be left
alone even at the cost of losing government aid is the best possible
illustration of why there are standing rules. And if the church itself com-
plained, its claim would sound most naturally in the free exercise clause.
Thus, fear that support will lead to interference is reason to want an
establishment clause, but it is the support, and not the interference, that
is the establishment.
Laycock, supra note 11, at 1383.
112. Paty v. McDaniel, 547 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1977).
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eligible for such service,' 3 he asked the United States Supreme Court
to overturn the decision as a violation of both the free exercise and
establishment clauses."' The Court declined the opportunity to con-
sider whether this religious disqualification was a law inhibiting
religion in violation of the establishment clause, but confined its
holding to the free exercise clause, which was held to be infringed."'
N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago"' furnished another
opportunity for the Court to apply the "inhibits" test, this time in
the context of a challenge to the National Labor Relation Board's
jurisdiction over labor disputes in two Roman Catholic high schools.
On the face of it, the constitutional issue should have been free exer-
cise since no school aid of any kind was involved: the N.L.R.B. was
simply interfering with the church's efforts to handle its own labor
disputes. Intervention by the N.L.R.B. was, of course, a form of en-
tanglement, and since everyone knew that "entanglement" was a label
associated with the establishment clause, that clause was naturally
implicated (regardless of the common sense of matter). The issue of
establishment by inhibition did not come to the Court focussed very
sharply because the Appeals Court, probably sensing the anomaly,
based its decision on the "Religion Clauses" in the plural," ' and counsel
for the Catholic Bishop also argued that both clauses were implicated.
The facts offered the Court a tailor-made opportunity either to clarify
past confusion by admitting that only free exercise was involved, or
to compound past error by holding that government restrictions on
church freedom of action are indeed a form of establishment. The
113. 1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 848, S 4.
114. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (Appellant's Brief at 2).
115. Id. The Chief Justice wrote for a plurality of four. Justice Stewart con-
curred, also on free exercise grounds, id. at 642 (Stewart, J., concurring); and Justice
White concurred on equal protection grounds, id. at 643 (White, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan, in a concurrence joined by Justice Marshall, was not so reluctant to face
the establishment issue. Not only did the Tennessee law violate the free exercise clause;
it also had "a primary effect which inhibits religion" (a very believable conclusion),
id. at 636 (Brennan, J., concurring), and, as such, ran afoul of the establishment clause
as well. "The Establishment Clause, properly understood, is a shield against any attempt
by government to inhibit religion as it is done here; Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)." Id. at 641. The whole burden of the present essay runs to
the contrary: the establishment clause, properly understood, is a shield against govern-
ment efforts to advance religion, not to inhibit it; the free exercise clause performs
the latter function. But, however misconceived, Justice Brennan's application of the
clause is consistent with what the Court has been saying since Schempp.
116. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
117. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. N.L.R.B., 559 F.2d 1112, 1131 (7th Cir., 1977).
118. 440 U.S. at 502, 503, 504, 507.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 [1984], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss2/2
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
Court did neither. Rather than facing the constitutional question, the
Court concluded that the significant risk of a first amendment viola-
tion mandated a construction of the statute precluding N.L.R.B.
jurisdiction of church-operated schools. In discussing the risk of con-
stitutional violation the Court focussed on the establishment
precedents dealing with entanglement but, in the end, adopted the
Appellate Court's position that both religion clauses would be
implicated."' "The substantial religious character of these church-
related schools," said the Court, citing Lemon as authority, "gives rise
to entangling church-state relationships of the kind the Religion
Clauses sought to avoid."".9 Given the Court's assertion that the
establishment clause was implicated at least in part, the conclusion
logically follows that burdensome government regulation may violate
the establishment clause even when totally divorced from the aid con-
text. Because the case ultimately turned on statutory construction,
however, that proposition remains in the realm of dictum rather than
holding.
In two other cases the Court chose to avoid substantive discus-
sion of the establishment clause altogether. In St. Martin Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. South Dakota,"' the Court was urged to find that
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)"' could not, consistent
with the establishment clause, be applied to a secondary school
operated by the petitioner church." The Court bypassed the constitu-
tional question by construing the statute in favor of exempting the
church from its coverage. The statutory construction escape valve was
not available in Widmar v. Vincent,123 where respondent Vincent also
argued that the establishment clause was violated by refusal of the
University of Missouri at Kansas City to allow a religious group, on
an equal basis with other student groups, to hold meetings in Univer-
sity facilities. 2 " The Court, however, continued to avoid a decision
directly premised on "establishment" by hostile governmental action
and instead rested its holding on the more credible first amendment
principle that state regulation of speech must be content-neutral, In
this case the University's policy discriminated against speech because
of its religious content.
119. Id. at 503.
120. 451 U.S. 772 (1981).
121. 26 U.S.C. SS 3301-3311 (1977).
122. Petitioner's Brief at 30, St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South
Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981).
123. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
124. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (Respondent's Brief at 44 et seq.).
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Larson v. Valente: A New Rule But the Same False Premise
Larson v. Valente25 and Bob Jones University v. United States'"
also required the Court during its 1981 and 1982 terms to confront
establishment clauses challenges to burdensome government regula-
tions. In neither was the issue of establishment by inhibition directly
raised, however, because the complaining parties focused on the
discriminatory impact of the regulations as an unconstitutional
preference for religious not so burdened. In form at least, such an
argument is consistent with the idea that establishment means sup-
port. But an aggrieved religious organization can all too easily allege
unconstitutional "preference" when the real basis of the complaint is
the disability and not the preference. In Bob Jones the Court avoided
this trap. The University had contended that the revocation of its
tax exempt status, because of policies against interracial dating and
marriage, was an unconstitutional preference for religions whose tenets
do not require such discrimination. The Court simply brushed aside
the argument with a footnote assertion "that a regulation does not
violate the Establishment Clause merely because it 'happens to coin-
cide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions' ."127
In Larson v. Valente,2 ' however, the Court agreed that Min-
nesota's Charitable Contributions Act violated the establishment clause
because some, but not all, religious organizations were exempted from
its regulations. Justice Brennan, for the majority, was careful to iden-
tify "preference" for the favored religions as the basis of the deci-
sion, and in this instance the Court suspected that the legislative pro-
vision was drafted with the intent of preferring some denominations
over others." But even in Larson, the problem turned out to be the
burden on the disfavored religions rather than the benefit to the
favored ones-which can only encourage use of the preference
125. 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1983).
126. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
127. Bob Jones Univ., at 2035 n.30, quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 422 (1961).
128. 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1983).
129. Id. at 1688. A similar suspicion was entertained by the lower courts that
heard the case. See, Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1981), where the
court said:
The statutory discrimination between such organizations smacks of
'religious gerrymandering,' an apparently intentional favoritism for the
religious organizations obtaining some but less than half of their funds
from the public...; intentional discrimination is a very real issue, in the
absence of any explanation for the sizable loophole created for some
religious organizations.
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rationale in other situations where no intent to aid any religion is
apparent."a In this and other ways Larson illustrates the continuing
effects of the "establishment by inhibition" premise, and must
therefore be examined in greater detail.
Larson v. Valente originated in a challenge to provisions of the
Minnesota Charitable Contributions Act'3 ' which imposed registration
and reporting requirements upon most organizations soliciting con-
tributions from the public but expressly exempted religious organiza-
tions that received more than half of their total contributions from
their own members or from affiliated organizations.'" Plaintiffs were
the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity
(Unification Church) and four of its members who alleged that the
Act as applied to them was an abridgement of their first amendment
rights of free speech and religion and their fourteenth amendment
right to equal protection. Although each of these claims was argued
in the lower courts, only the establishment issue was presented to
the Supreme Court.'33
130. If Larson's scope is limited to statutes which make "explicit and deliberate
distinctions between different religious organizations," as Justice Brennan suggested
in a footnote, a finding of unconstitutional preference would be unlikely, or at least
uncommon, since very few statutes make explicit classifications based on religious af-
filiation. In that event, however, the rule itself would have a very limited application
and therefore little effect upon establishment clause jurisprudence. In Justice White's
opinion such a finding could not be made even in the present case, since the Min-
nesota statute named no churches or denominations and based the exemption on secular
criteria, i.e., "the source of their contributions, not on their brand of religion." Hence,
"To say that the rule on its face represents an explicit and deliberate preference for
some religious beliefs over others is not credible."102 S. Ct. at 1692 (White, J.,
concurring).
Even counsel for Valente argued that the case was one of a kind: "Indeed, the
guarantee of neutrality is so fundamental to our democratic system that, in the almost
two hundred years since the adoption of the First Amendment, the Court has not
until now been presented with a law that expressly divides religious organizations
into separate categories for different governmental treatment." Id. (Petitioner's Brief
at 15).
131. MINN. STAT. S 309.50-309.61 (1969 and Supp. 1980).
132. MINN. STAT. S 309.515-1(b) (1969). From 1961, when the statute was first
enacted, until 1978, all religious organizations were exempt from the Act's requirements.
The 50% rule was added by amendment effective March 30, 1978, 1978 Minn. Laws,
ch. 601 S 5. Other organizations were also exempted by S 309.515 of the Act, for exam-
ple, patriotic and fraternal societies that limit solicitation to voting members, certain
organizations whose public solicitations are less than $10,000 annually, and educational
institutions supervised by a state board or a national accrediting association. The non-
religious exemptions were not challenged.
133. In dissent Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice White
and Justice O'Connor, contended that the plaintiffs had no standing to challenge the
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The Appellate Court had rested its decision primarily upon the
first prong of the Lemon test, i.e., there was "no ascertainable 'secular
legislative purpose' for granting an exemption to churches obtaining
less than 50% of their contributions from nonmembers."l The lower
court also concluded that the exemption failed the effects test because
it relieved favored religions from the burdens of registration and
reporting.13 The Supreme Court, taking an approach that must have
caught most observers by surprise, declared the Lemon test inap-
plicable to the present case. The Lemon test, according to the Court,
was "intended to apply to laws affording a uniform benefit to all
religions, and not to provisions, like § 309.515-1(b)'s fifty per cent rule,
that discriminate among religions.""3 6 Instead a stricter standard
applies. Laws "granting a denominational preference" must be
"justified by a compelling governmental interest" and closely fitted
to further that interest."'37
In the true spirit of stare decisis, Justice Brennan suggested that
such had been the rule all along. As he read prior cases, "when we
are presented with a state law granting a denominational preference,
our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that
we apply strict scrutiny in adjudicating its constitutionality."'" Fur-
ther support for the preexistence of the rule was found in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,"9 where the three-prong test was first enunciated. As
authority for the various parts of the test, Lemon had cited Board
of Education v. Allen' and Walz v. Tax Commission,"" each of which
had upheld a statute that provided benefits without denominational
restriction. For Justice Brennan the citation of these cases had special
significance. It meant that the Lemon rule was, and presumably always
had been, limited to laws having a nondiscriminatory application as
between religions. 4 '
limitation on the religious exemption because the Unification Church had not yet been
proved to be a religious organization and hence would not necessarily benefit from
a decision invalidating the limitation.
134. Valente v. Larson, 637 F2d 562, 567 (8th Cir. 1981).
135. Id. at 566-69.
136. 102 S. Ct. at 1687 (1982) (emphasis in original).
137. Id. at 1684-85.
138. Id. at 1684. The precedents cited as a basis for this conclusion were
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); and, perhaps significantly, Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), a leading equal protection case.
139. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
140. 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
141. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
142. "As our citations of Allen and Walz indicated, the Lemon v. Kurtzman
'tests' are intended to apply to laws affording a uniform benefit to all religions, and
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Justice Brennan's attempt to back date the new rule was not
convincing. To be sure, Allen, Walz, and Lemon-and most of the other
establishment clauses cases-addressed laws which, facially at least,
provided a uniform benefit to all religions. But nothing in Lemon, or
Allen, or Walz suggested that the rule should be limited to such cases.
The distinction was certainly lost on the lower courts: since Lemon,
nearly every state and federal court confronting an establishment
clause issue has grappled with some aspect of the Lemon test. The
lower courts in Larson v. Valente applied Lemon without hesitation.
Even the Supreme Court, as recently as November, 1980, recited the
Lemon test in the process of invalidating, by summary reversal, a
Kentucky statute that required the posting of the Ten Commandments
on the wall of each public classroom in the state."' The offending
statute in that case certainly did not afford "a uniform benefit" to
non-Christian, non-Jewish faiths; but for some reason the Court
thought Lemon was applicable. Indeed, the first two prongs of the
Lemon test, in approximately their present form, were enunciated in
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp... where the Court struck down a
Pennsylvania law which required the reading of at least ten verses
from the Holy Bible at the opening of each day in the public schools.
By no stretch of the imagination could such a law be said to provide
a uniform benefit to all religions."'
The new doctrine, certainly, had copious antecedents. The notion
of strict neutrality as between different religions has strong historical
roots1" and has frequently been reiterated in the establishment cases."'
Indeed, Epperson v. Arkansas, in an oft cited expression, had
characterized the constitutional prohibition on religious favoritism as
not to provisions, like S 309.515-1(b)'s fifty percent rule, that discriminate among
religions." Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1687 (emphasis in original).
143. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980).
144. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Lemon added the entanglement test of Walz to the
two-pronged Schempp test to produce the three-prong Lemon test.
145. Not quite everyone had missed the point, however. To counsel for Valente
and the Unification Church it was clear that the Minnesota law was discriminatory
on its face, and hence invalid without more since the Lemon tests were unnecessary
"where a law conflicts on its face with the establishment clause's core guarantee of
neutrality..." Appellee's Brief at 31, emphasis in the original. See also discussion by
appellee, id. at 14-28.
146. See, e.g., 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, S 1872, 1876-1877 (3d ed. Boston 1858). See also 2 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 974-75, (W.. Carrington ed. 1927).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Gillette, 401 U.S. 437, 449-50 (1971); Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970);
Abington School Dist. v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 314 (1952); and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16, 18 (1947).
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"absolute.""14 But the shape of the new rule, with its requirement that
a denominational preference be "justified by a compelling state in-
terest" and "closely fitted to further that interest,"4 9 suggested that
it had more in common with recent precedents arising in equal pro-
tection, freedom of expression, and free exercise of religion than with
establishment clause decisions.
Justice Brennan cited Widmar v. Vincent'50 and Murdock v.
Pennsylvania"' as specific authority for this formulation. In Widmar,
decided earlier the same term, a state university's denial of campus
facilities to a student religious group (while accommodating other stu-
dent groups) had raised free exercise and establishment issues as well
as free speech. The Court based its decision only on the speech clause,
however. The university policy was found to be a discriminatory,
content-based exclusion of religious speech from a public forum which
violated first amendment speech guarantees because it was not
"necessary to a compelling state interest" and "narrowly drawn to
achieve that end."' 52 Murdock raised no issues of establishment at all.
Rather it upheld, on free speech and free exercise grounds, the right
of Jehovah's Witnesses to engage in door-to-door tracting and
solicitation.
In Larson v. Valente, recourse to precedents dealing with freedom
of expression would surely have been appropriate had the issue been
raised before the Court." The public solicitation of funds clearly falls
within the range of protected expressive activities."' But the
precedents cited were not directly on point because freedom of
expression was not invoked on appeal and the Court did not purport
to be using free speech analysis. Presumably, having decided that
148. 393 U.S. at 106 (1968).
149. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1981).
150. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
151. 319 U.S. 105, 116-17 (1943).
152. 454 U.S. at 274, 278. For other cases using a similar test, see, e.g., Schad
v. Mt. Ephriam, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530 (1980); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968).
153. In Widmar for example, the speech clause was argued as an alternative
ground for attacking the university exclusion policy, and this turned out to be most
persuasive to the Court. But see Justice White's objection to treating religious speech
as indistinguishable from other speech protected by the first amendment, 454 U.S.
at 281-83 (White, J., dissenting).
154. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620
(1980); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 435 U.S. 610 (1976); Heffron v. International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943).
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strict scrutiny was appropriate, the Court simply looked to tests ap-
plied in other areas where strict scrutiny was also the rule. This may
account for the affinity of the new establishment test with free exer-
cise and equal protection analysis. In those areas of the law strict
scrutiny tests are constructed from such concepts as "substantial" or
"compelling" governmental interests and "closely fitted," "narrowly
drawn", or "least restrictive" means."'
Substantively, Larson v. Valente is analyzed more appropriately
under the free exercise clause than the establishment clause. The plain-
tiff was complaining primarily about the burden imposed by the law,
not the preference. He sought only to make the exemption generally
applicable to all religions. Alternatively, the facts present a strong
equal protection claim based on the discriminatory classification or,
as noted above, a question of freedom of expression. The Court
necessarily responded to the establishment clause question, as that
was the principal issue of substance presented on appeal. However,
it did so with free speech precedents using analysis most analogous
to the strict scrutiny of suspect classifications under the equal pro-
tection clause.
The Court did not quarrel with the substantiality of the state's
interest in protecting the public against fraudulent solicitation or with
the reasonableness of the reporting requirements as a means to the
end.' Rather, the sticking point was the inability of the state to justify
classification of religious organizations on the basis of funds received
from public solicitations. The essence of an equal protection violation
is unjustified, discriminatory classification, and this is the precise
respect in which the Court found the statute lacking. The regulation
may have been "addressed to a sufficiently 'compelling' state govern-
ment interest,"'57 but the classification was not "closely fitted" to fur-
ther that interest." In so holding, the Court rejected Minnesota's argu-
ment that membership control would be an adequate safeguard against
abusive public solicitation only if the organization received less than
155. Among the free exercise cases see Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). And for equal protection versions of strict
scrutiny see, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
156. "We do not suggest," said the Court, "that the burdens of compliance
with the Act would be intrinsically impermissible if they were imposed evenhandedly."
Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1688.
157. Id. at 1685.
158. Id. at 1687.
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half its funds from nonmember contributions. This is straight equal
protection analysis of the strict scrutiny variety-but the Court per-
formed it under the rubric of the establishment clause rather than
equal protection.
The cause of clarity and principled analysis would have been
better served had the Court been able to proceed under the equal
protection label. There is ample precedent for applying the equal pro-
tection clause to first amendment free speech concerns, and those cases
are linked to Larson v. Valente by a very short chain of citations.
159
Such a use of equal protection strict scrutiny to guard against
discriminatory content regulation also has a strong theoretical base
if one accepts the Karst position that equality "is not just a peripheral
support for the freedom of expression, but rather a part of the 'cen-
tral meaning of the first amendment.'"' Furthermore, if strict
scrutiny of equal protection claims can be invoked in favor of "fun-
damental" rights and interests not expressly mentioned in the Con-
stitution, such as the right to vote in state elections.' or the right
to interstate travel,'" it surely should be available for the protection
of rights fundamental enough to be expressly embodied in that
document.' 3
159. Larson cited Widmark as authority for its strict scrutiny test, although
Widmark was a free speech case. Widmark's authority for the same test was Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) which, like Widmark, involved content-based restrictions
on expressive activity but, unlike Widmark, was decided on equal protection grounds.
The Court in Carey applied strict scrutiny to an Illinois ban on residential picketing
and found a denial of equal protection because labor picketing was excluded from the
ban. Carey, in turn, relied heavily on Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972) which similarly had invalidated an anti-picketing ordinance on equal protection
grounds because it exempted peaceful labor picketing.
See also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976Y Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23 (1968); and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
160. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI.
L. REV. 20, 21 (1975). The quoted words are taken from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).
161. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
162. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). But see Jones
v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981).
163. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 908 (10th ed.
1980), calls "traditional" the notion that an equal protection mode of analysis may be
applied when governmental action discriminatorily burdens a right clearly embodied
in the Constitution -e.g., the First Amendment. In that traditional situation, heightened
scrutiny is triggered because of the presence of a basic right drawn from a constitu-
tional source other than the equal protection clause.
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To date such equal protection analysis has been applied mainly
to the speech and association guarantees of the first amendment, but
the guarantees of religious liberty are equally fundamental and no
obvious reason appears for distinguishing between religion and speech
in this context. In Karst's terms, equality is as "central" to the religion
clauses as to the speech clause: the very core of the establishment
clause guarantee is the prohibition against treating religions unequally
by elevating one above the others.1"
The decision of the Court in Larson v. Valente may therefore
be entirely justified on equal protection grounds. Unfortunately, as
a religion clause decision it adds another level of confusion to the
already muddled Supreme Court doctrines of establishment by sug-
gesting that the central issue is forbidden support for favored religions
when the real problem is the burden on the less favored religions
arising from the discriminatory classification. The remedy prescribed
exposes the transparency of the attempt by the Court to imply that
the root evil is support for religion. Instead of invalidating the ex-
emption for the favored religious organizations, the Court extends the
exemption to all religious organizations. It does not eliminate the
benefit, which should be the proper remedy for an establishment viola-
tion; rather it eliminates the burden. The latter is appropriate to a
free exercise violation but not to a law respecting establishment, ex-
cept to the extent that denying a benefit to a favored religion coin-
cidentally lifts a burden from the less favored. No such exceptional
case is found here: the Court simply declares benefits to religion all
around.185 Cases from Everson onward have adamantly avowed that
the establishment clause is violated by "laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another... 8
164. Application of strict scrutiny to religious classifications would, however,
require disregarding the dictum in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974),
that strict scrutiny of fundamental rights under the equal protection clause may not
be invoked unless the fundamental right itself is violated. This conclusion is clearly
wrong because it makes the fundamental rights strand of equal protection analysis
wholly redundant. If the underlying constitutional right has been violated, there is
no purpose in showing that equal protection is also violated. Furthermore, as the facts
of Larson illustrate, the underlying right and the equal protection clause may address
different concerns. Free exercise might not require that all churches be exempt from
state financial regulations, but the state ought to have a compelling justification for
regulating some churches and not others. For a discussion of the general problem,
see Laycock, Book Review, 59 TEX. L. REV. 343, 391-393.
165. This also ought to be contrary to the establishment clause if the benefit
to religion is the real problem.
166. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). A uniform exemption
for all religious organizations would not necessarily run afoul of the establishment
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The analytical shortcomings of Larson flow directly from the
basic error of the Court's establishment clause doctrine: the notion
that religion is established when it is inhibited as well as when it
is advanced. If that proposition is correct, then of course the Court
need not be concerned with whether it is dealing with burdens or
benefits. Either may be removed in the name of the establishment
clause. But that proposition is correct only by fiat of the Court, in
defiance of all good sense and historical experience with religious
establishments. 7
Despite the new doctrine that Lemon is not applicable to cases
of "denominational preference," the Court nevertheless felt obliged
to demonstrate that the Minnesota law failed the Lemon entangle-
ment test as well as the new strict scrutiny standard. In reaching
this conclusion the Court emphasized the political divisiveness aspect
of the test, as well as the burdens of administrative entanglement
and excessive governmental direction of churches." 8 The analysis re-
tained at least a tenuous link with reality through its reference to
the advantage conferred upon nonregulated religions, but this did not
appear to be a very essential part of the reasoning. The "politicizing"
clause. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) upheld property tax exemptions for
church property used for religious purposes as part of a larger category of charitable
exemptions. The Minnesota statute, as amended by the Supreme Court, would pre-
sent a closer case because it singles out religious organizations for a special exemp-
tion rather than exempting them as part of a larger class, as in Walz.
167. To insist that Larson presents no genuine issue of establishment does
not imply that denominational preferences are permitted by the establishment clause.
They clearly are not. But the question is, what constitutes a preference? Is it limited
to laws intended to advance particular religious organizations? Laws which have the
primary effect of advancing religion? Laws intended to inhibit certain religious groups,
or having that effect despite their secular purpose? I would argue that a "preference"
which exists only as an exemption from some burden that one or more other religious
organizations must bear, and which is not intended to advance any religious belief
or organization, does not raise an establishment issue. The law which benefits or prefers
a religion only in the sense that some other religion is burdened is really a free exer-
cise problem. Thus, revocation of a church-related school's tax exemption because of
the school's racially discriminatory policies does not amount to a preference that
establishes all the other schools. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp.
890 (D.S.C. 1978), which held that it did, but was reversed, Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), afj'd 103 S.Ct. 2017 (1983). The appeals court agreed
that a "preference" existed but deemed that it was outweighed by the compelling
government interest in racial equality. The Supreme Court found no substantial
establishment issue. There is no theoretical reason, however, why Bob Jones could
not raise an equal protection issue in such a situation, although again the interest
in racial equality might override the unequal application of the tax laws as between
religious organizations.
168. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1687 (1982).
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of religion and the administrative burdens on the disfavored sects were
sufficiently obvious in the Court's mind, to violate the establishment
clause, even though no church was aided by the political conflict or
the burdensome regulations.
The Inhibits Test in the Lower Courts: Over the Brink
The Supreme Court has thus far shrunk from converting its "in-
hibits" dictum into holding, but lower courts have carried the doc-
trine to its logical conclusion. This occurred explicitly in Chess v.
Widmar,'6 ' the lower court version of Widmar v. Vincent.'0 There the
Eighth Circuit found that denying a student religious group the
privilege of using campus facilities at the University of Missouri at
Kansas City, on equal terms with other student groups, was un-
constitutional establishment because of its inhibiting effect upon
religion. In the court's words:
... UMKC's current regulation has the primary effect of
inhibiting religion, an effect which violates the Establish-
ment Clause just as does governmental advancement of
religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S. at 612-613
... The University's policy singles out and stigmatizes cer-
tain religious activity and, in consequence, discredits
religious groups.'7'
The court did not expand its analysis of the establishment clause
violation but chose to place primary emphasis on the University's
abridgement of free speech through unjustified content regulation.'72
The establishment clause was discussed mainly for the purpose of
showing that the University's policy was not justified by its interest
in avoiding an establishment of religion, which, it claimed, would result
from opening campus facilities to student religious groups. The court
disagreed with this assertion.'73 Nevertheless, the court clearly held
that the policy was invalid as a violation of the establishment clause
as well as the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment. As
previously noted, the Supreme Court prudently avoided the establish-
ment issue when reviewing the case and rested its decision on the
speech clause.'
169. 635 F.2a 1310 (8th Cir. 1980).
170. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
171. 635 F.2d at 1317.
172. Id. at 1312-1317, 1320.
173. Id. at 1318-1320.
174. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). See also discussion supra in text accompanying notes
123-124. Briefs for Student-Respondents also argued the establishment clause viola-
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While Chess v. Widmar is perhaps the clearest instance of a lower
court applying the "inhibits" test to invalidate governmental action,
it does not stand alone. In granting a preliminary injunction against
assertion of N.L.R.B. jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving lay
teachers in a parochial school, the court in McCormick v. Hirsch175
based its action at least in part on a finding that the burden of
N.L.R.B. intrusion into school affairs was an effect proscribed by the
second prong of Lemon.
...From the description of the powers of the NLRB in
the above discussion, nothing more need be said here 'as
to the likely harm to the church that would be caused by
the Board's intrusion upon such areas as the religious run-
ning of the institution. The effect would be both direct and
substantial and the end result would be a policy that in-
hibits religion.171
In Guterman v. Schweiker'1 the holding was somewhat less explicit
but, by implication, the court appeared to adopt the rationale of the
"inhibits" test. Plaintiff Guterman was required by the tenets of his
religious faith to walk to his place of worship. There being no public
housing or other housing that he could afford within walking distance,
his rent was subsidized by Jewish Family Services. Because of the
subsidy, however, Guterman lost a portion of his social security
benefits (SSI). In holding the loss of benefits to be a violation of Guter-
man's constitutional rights, the court focused primarily on the free
exercise clause. Nevertheless, in an unelaborated statement near the
end of the opinion the court observed: "In order to avoid violation
both of the Free Exercise and of the Establishment Clauses, defen-
dant must adjust plaintiffs SSI benefits. .. 17 Since the court had
spoken only of burdens, and the facts would admit no "entanglement"
argument, the establishment clause violation could only have reference
to the inhibiting effect of the reduced payment. 79
tion. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 13-14, and Respondent's Brief
at 44-48. The attorneys for the Respondent tried to make sense of the concept by
talking of the "neutrality" required by the religion, clauses and by suggesting that
inhibiting religion meant "advancing" secularism. Such a rationale does not eliminate
the problem of distinguishing between establishment and free exercise guarantees,
but at least it ties establishment to support of some kind of ideology, if only the
nonreligious idea of secularism.
175. 460 F. Supp. 1337 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
176. Id. at 1357. The court also found impermissible entanglement and a viola-
tion of free exercise.
177. 520 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
178. Id. at 93.
179. In Attorney General v. Bailey, 436 N.E.2d 139 (Mass. 1982) the plaintiff
challenged a Massachusetts statute requiring church schools to report the name, age,
[Vol. 18
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"Entanglement" in the Lower Courts
While only a few lower courts have accepted Lemon's invitation
to invalidate governmental acts by application of the inhibits test, a
great many have looked for unconstitutional establishment in the
potentiality for burdensome governmental entanglement. Frequently
the issue has arisen from attempts by the Federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to enforce employment discrimination pro-
visions of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.180 In no meaningful
sense can federal efforts to regulate employment practices in parochial
schools or other church-related institutions be treated as a form of
support or advancement. On its face it is all burden and no benefit,
at least as viewed from the institutional perspective of the church.
Yet, because of the state of the law, the church has frequently been
in the anomalous position of arguing that it is being unconstitutional-
ly established by the burdensome entanglement. In most of the cases
the court has rejected the argument-not for the obvious reason that
burdens do not create an establishment but because the entanglement
was not sufficiently burdensome to violate the first amendment.18'
The issue of entanglement, unconnected with any form of aid
and residence of every child enrolled. The plaintiff argued that the law violated the
establishment clause "because it inhibits religion and fosters an excessive government
entanglement with religion." I& at 146. The Court concluded that the primary effect
of the law could not be regarded "as inhibiting religion." Id. at 147. See also E.E.O.C.
v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), where the court analyzed the im-
pact of Title VII on a church college as an entanglement problem but frankly recognized
that entanglement was just another form of establishment through the imposition of
burdens:
Although the Supreme Court generally has construed the establishment
clause in the context of governmental action that benefitted a religious
activity [citations omitted], it is now clear that the establishment clause
is implicated by a statute that potentially burdens religious activities. See
N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500-502 (1979). The
three-prong test employed in Lemon to determine whether government
entanglement is excessive applies with equal force to such cases.
Id. at 487.
180. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e et seq. (1977).
181. See E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press Publ. Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982);
E.E.O.C. v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981);
E.E.O.C. v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980); Russell v. Belmont Col-
lege, 554 F. Supp. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (also involving an Equal Pay Act challenge);
Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980). But see E.E.O.C.
v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 485 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Tex. 1980), where
a federal district court held that the application of Title VII to a church seminary
would lead to "excessive governmental entanglement with religion violative of the
establishment clause," as well as infringement of the free exercise clause. Id. at 261.
The decision was reversed on appeal, E.E.O.C. v. Southwestern Baptist Theological
Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 286 (5th Cir. 1981).
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to religion, has been litigated in a variety of other contexts besides
Title VII. Exercise of N.L.R.B. jurisdiction over labor disputes in
parochial schools has been held to risk unconstitutional entanglement,"
as has denial of the use of state university facilities to student religious
groups on an equal basis with other student groups.183 The same is
true of state regulation of charitable solicitation by religious
organizations,'" and solicitation of information on the costs of operating
private schools.'85 Courts have held both ways in adjudicating the con-
stitutionality of unemployment compensation laws as applied to church
schools. The South Dakota Supreme Court found unconstitutional
entanglement, 88 while a federal district court in North Carolina held
the entanglement not to be excessive. 187 In two cases involving the
Internal Revenue Service the reexamination of a church's tax exempt
status'88 and the issuance of an IRS administrative summons to the
pastor of a church were held not to constitute burdensome
entanglement.'89 Likewise, state courts in New Jersey' and
Tennessee 9' have rejected entanglement challenges in upholding the
application of state licensing and accreditation requirements to church
182. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. N.L.R.B., 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977); McCor-
mick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Pa. 1978).
183. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 914 (W.D. Mo. 1979), affd 635 F.2d
1310, 1318 (8th Cir. 1980).
184. Heritage Village Christian Church v. State, 263 S.E.2d 726 (N.C. 1980).
The Court also found establishment in the exemption of some religious organizations
from regulation.
185. Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979), rev'g 460
F. Supp. 121 (D.C. Puerto Rico 1978), in which the district court found the degree
of entanglement insufficient to raise the constitutional issue.
186. In the Matter of Northwestern Lutheran Academy, 290 N.W.2d 845 (S.D.
1980).
187. Ascension Lutheran Church v. Employment Sec. Comm'n of N.C., 501 F.
Supp. 843 (W.D.N.C. 1980). The North Carolina Supreme Court examined the same
entanglement question but ultimately concluded that religious schools were statutorily
exempt from unemployment compensation laws. Grace Lutheran Church v. North Dakota
Employment Sec. Bureau, 294 N.W.2d 767 (N.D. 1980).
188. United States v. Coates, 526 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Cal. 1981) affd 692 F.2d
629 (9th Cir. 1982).
189. United States v. Freedom Church, 613 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1979).
190. New Jersey State Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Bd. of Directors of Shelton Col-
lege, 448 A.2d 988 (N.J. 1982).
191. Tennessee ex rel. McLemore v. Clarksville School, 636 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn.
1982). But see Bangor Baptist Church v. Maine, 549 F. Supp. 1208 (D.C. Me. 1982),
where a federal district court denied the State's motion for summary judgment in
a suit to enjoin enforcement, as against religious schools, of a state requirement that
private schools offer "equivalent instruction" to public schools. The court believed that
the plaintiff church should be entitled to prove, if it could, that the "burden on [its]
religious practices" would constitute excessive entanglement. Id. at 1222.
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colleges. Although the outcome of such cases has varied with the facts,
they illustrate how extensively the notion of establishment through
burdensome governmental entanglement with religion has penetrated
the jurisprudence of state and lower federal courts.
Lemon in the Lower Courts: Summation
The impact of the Lemon test on lower court opinions has been
substantial, and its applications have extended well beyond anything
the Supreme Court has thus far been willing to approve in its own
decisions. While the Supreme Court has limited its use of the "in-
hibits" test to dicta, and has found unconstitutional entanglement only
where government regulation is in some way related to the administra-
tion of public aid to religious organizations, state and lower federal
courts have carried Lemon to its logical conclusion by finding un-
constitutional establishment in governmental action that merely
burdens religion. This can only create confusion for lawyers and judges
alike, promoting bad analysis as participants in the judicial process
struggle to apply rules that turn the traditional concept of religious
establishment on its head.
Over time, of course, the meaning of a concept may change and
a new meaning may become widely accepted even though it contradicts
the old in some respects. When the Supreme Court propagates the
new meaning there is obvious incentive for others, in the legal pro-
fession at least, to fall into line. Thus, the concept of establishment
of religion may cease to mean governmental promotion of a particular
church or religious doctrine or observance, but rather be expanded
to include any governmental action that has a significant effect on
religion, whether to advance or inhibit. Confusion is created during
the transition period, but ultimately lawyers can adjust to the new
meaning. In constitutional law another cost is imposed by such con-
ceptual evolution: the framers' intent becomes less relevant because
they used the concept in its former meaning. Still, lawyers and judges
have been able to accept that too, some even arguing that the framers'
intent is not a very essential element of constitutional interpretation
anyway. 92 Whether we should have to live with the costs of transi-
tional confusion and disregard of the framers' original understanding
is another thing. Costs can be willingly paid to obtain a thing of
192. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
BOSTON U. L. REv. 204 (1980); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 98-110 (1962).
See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958): "[T]he [Eighth] Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society."
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greater value. Unfortunately, what thing of greater value we obtain
by the Supreme Court's perversion of the establishment concept is
not yet evident. In the lower courts we currently have confusion of
meaning but no corresponding benefit.
Furthermore, the confusion is more than semantical. To the
extent that the court's new concept of establishment is adopted, the
Lemon formula obfuscates - indeed almost obliterates - the distinction
between the establishment and the free exercise clauses. This is
especially well illustrated by the first circuit opinion in Surinach v.
Pesquera de Busquets93 where the court felt obliged to examine the
same facts twice, once in light of the free exercise clause and once
as an establishment issue. Puerto Rico's request for cost information
from church schools was found to entail a burden on free exercise
as well as excessive entanglement, thus violating both the free exer-
cise and the establishment clauses. The court obviously recognized
it was left with no meaningful distinction between the two types of
burdens and ultimately lumped both clauses together in finding a con-
stitutional violation:
Given our conclusion that the Secretary's demands for
the financial data of these schools both burden the free ex-
ercise of religion and pose a threat of entanglement between
the affairs of church and state, the Commonwealth must
show that "some compelling state interest" justifies that
burden [citations omitted] and that there exists no less
restrictive or entangling alternative.94
It is of interest that the court relied upon the free exercise standard
of review-compelling state interest and less restrictive alternatives,
perhaps tacitly recognizing that the essence of the matter was the
burden on free exercise. Still, the logic of Lemon had forced the court
into a confusing and redundant establishment clause analysis.'95
Happily, there are a few exceptional lower court opinions that
have not abandoned common sense in their efforts to apply confusing
193. 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979).
194. Id. at 79.
195. In a similarly redundant analysis, McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. 1337
(N.D. Pa. 1978), found the assertion of N.L.R.B. jurisdiction over church schools a viola-
tion of both religion clauses because of the burdens it imposed. See also E.E.O.C. v.
Mississippi College, 451 F. Supp. 564 (S.D. Miss. 1978), where the court with little
analysis concluded that the first amendment precludes the E.E.O.C. "from investigating
charges of sex discrimination at a religious institution," and cited, without much discus-
sion, both free exercise and establishment precedents in support of its conclusion.
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Supreme Court precedents. One of the best is an opinion authored
by Justice Huskins of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Heritage
Village Church v. State,'" dissenting in part from the court's invalida-
tion of the North Carolina Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act. His
cogent establishment clause analysis merits quotation at length:
In the second part of its opinion the majority ... con-
cludes that the exemption granted under G.S. 108-75.7(a)(1)
constitutes an establishment because it fosters an excessive
government entanglement in religion. This conclusion is
clearly incorrect. The pertinent inquiry in an establishment
case is whether the aid or benefit granted by the state to
religion in general or particular religions is of a type which
violates the constitutional command of state neutrality with
respect to religion. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Commission, supra.
In terms of the entanglement test the pertinent inquiry is
whether the aid or benefit being granted by the state to
religion is of a type which cannot be administered without
excessive government involvement in the affairs of religion
or religious organization...Analysis of the benefit granted by
the state in the instant case compels the conclusion that
the . . . exemption in section 75.7(a)(1) does not carry with
it the seeds of an extensive and continuing government en-
tanglement. Quite to the contrary, the benefit accorded by
the exemption is one of freedom from further state
regulation...
The majority's conclusion in Part II that the Act
fosters an excessive entanglement with religion is based on
the regulatory burdens that would be imposed on plaintiffs
were they to be denied an exemption under section 75.7(a)(1).
The majority reasons that exposure to the regulatory
mechanisms of the Act would unduly burden plaintiffs'
religious activities. In effect, the majority's analysis focuses
on the extent of the burden imposed by other sections of
the Act on plaintiffs' free exercise of religion. Thus, the issue
raised by the majority in Part II of its opinion is not
whether the exemption in section 75.7(a)(1) constitutes an
establishment; rather, the true issue raised is whether the
provisions of the Act impermissibly infringe upon the free
exercise of religion.1
196. 263 S.E.2d 726, 736 (1980) (Huskins, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 741 (emphasis in original).
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Justice Huskins saw clearly the distinction between establishment as
benefit and violation of free exercise as burden. While I would ques-
tion the appropriateness of ever finding burdensome entanglement
to be an establishment of religion, even when imposed in connection
with parochial school subsidies," Justice Huskins unquestionably puts
the present Supreme Court precedents in their most favorable and
sensible light. If the entanglement concept can ever be reconciled with
the traditional meaning of establishment, it must be done through
reasoning such as that of Justice Huskins.1 "
Conclusion
To quote once again the words of Justice White, "Establishment
Clause cases are not easy; they stir deep feelings ...,"'I This is true
regardless of the specific content of the Lemon test or any other rele-
vant rules of law. It is no coincidence that the line of establishment
clause cases commencing with Everson has corresponded in time with
the growing secularization of American society. This is a setting for
conflict in the constitutional arena, as elsewhere, and no one should
anticipate that establishment clause litigation will soon run its course.
In such a sensitive subject area it is particularly unfortunate that
the paths to judicial resolution of conflict so often wind through
swamps of avoidable doctrinal confusion. The Lemon premise that
198. Of course the aid itself might constitute establishment if the governmen-
tal restrictions on its use for religious purposes were not sufficiently effective.
199. In United States v. Holmes, 614 F.2d 985, 989 (5th Cir. 1980), dealing with
a religion clause challenge to an IRS request to examine church financial records, the
court was similarly lucid in distinguishing free exercise from establishment:
.. .Plaintiff here phrases one of his objections to disclosure in terms
of the "excessive entanglement" it creates between Church and State.
Despite this language, plaintiff does not raise an establishment clause
challenge to the administration of the tax statute. Rather, the essence
of plaintiffs claim is that the government subpoena is an unwarranted
invasion of internal church affairs. Conceptually this argument is ground-
ed in the free exercise clause and not the establishment clause.
See also Christian School Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Pa., 423 A.2d 1340 (Pa. Commw.
1980), which treated the application of unemployment compensation statutes to church
schools as strictly a free exercise problem, rather than falling into the entanglement-
establishment trap like the courts cited in notes 181-191 supra. Keegan v. Univ. of
Delaware, 349 A2d 14 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975), likewise used free exercise analysis in
dealing with the University's refusal to let a student religious group use a dormitory
commons room, although the room was available to other student organizations. Cf.
Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979), which found a similar policy at
the University of Missouri-Kansas City to be an unconstitutional establishment of
religion.
200. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
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ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
religion is established by burdensome government regulation is surely
such an avoidable error. It has no basis in history or semantics; it
is pure judicial error compounded by repetition. Although Everson
is the beginning of the confusion, Everson-properly read-did not
embrace the expansive Lemon premise. Interpreted in light of Justice
Black's subsequent opinion in Engel v. Vitale, the inhibitions proscribed
by Everson dictum were only those traditionally recognized as in-
cidents of state support of an established church. Yet, with its broad
language and its inaccurate characterization of the establishment clause
as the sole foundation of Jefferson's "wall of separation," Everson
opened the door to the follies of Schempp and Lemon. With Schempp
the establishment clause was permitted to swallow free exercise by
bringing within its purview any law that either advances or inhibits
religion. Thus any government action properly raising a free exercise
question must necessarily raise an establishment question also. Lemon
completed the structure of the three-prong test by adding as a third
element the concept of unconstitutional "entanglement" earlier
elaborated in Walz v. Tax Commission. The addition of the entangle-
ment prong was very important in giving practical effect to the er-
roneous doctrinal concept of establishment by inhibition because, in
contrast to the inhibits element of the second prong, which remains
Supreme Court dictum, the entanglement test has actually been ap-
plied to strike down burdensome state regulation of religious institu-
tions. As one might anticipate, the error produced by the United
States Supreme Court has been compounded in state and lower federal
courts struggling to follow and apply a rule so greatly at variance
with traditional and common sense notions of religious establishment.
The modification of establishment clause doctrine suggested by
this paper would do nothing to undermine important values inhering
in the religion clauses. Establishment of a state church is still pro-
scribed. So is any form of governmental support, as long as its primary
effect is the advancement of religion. Thus the underlying value of
voluntarism continues to be fully vindicated. Nor is the principle of
neutrality as between religious sects or groups in any way diminished.
Laws preferring one religion over another could not survive the "ad-
vancement" test; neither could governmental action that selectively
places disabilities upon some religions but not others, if the purpose
or primary effect is in fact the advancement of the others. Obviously,
if the law were to advance the others only in the sense that a loss
to one religion is gain to all the others, no genuine establishment ques-
tion should be found, even though one religion suffers. But here free
exercise comes to the rescue since governmental burdens upon church-
affiliated organizations and upon religious worship are still subject
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to review as prohibitions upon free exercise. No additional "inhibi-
tion" test under the establishment clause is required to invalidate laws
burdening religious freedom. The free exercise guarantee also under-
pins the value of neutrality as between religion and irreligion. While
establishment speaks to violations of the neutrality principle through
governmental support of religion, free exercise raises a barrier to
governmental breaches of neutrality arising from discrimination
against religion.
Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaphor has great appeal
because it embodies values deeply embedded in our constitutional and
societal tradition. These are the values of governmental neutrality
and private voluntarism in religious affairs. Each religion clause ad-
dresses a somewhat different aspect of the problem. Together they
fully protect those cherished values. Nothing is gained by attempting
to make one clause do the work of the other; but much is lost through
the ensuing sacrifice of "clarity and predictability."
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